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Nexus between Inflation, 
Inflation Perceptions and Expectations† 
By MINHO NAM AND MINJI GO* 
We uncover a nexus between actual inflation, inflation perceptions and 
expectations in Korea through analyzing micro as well as aggregate 
data from the Consumer Survey. We document two novel findings. 
First, households’ subjective perceptions of inflation exert more impact 
on expectation formation than actual inflation. Second, inflation 
perceptions are broadly in line with the trajectory of the inflation trend. 
This is attributable to the fact that changes in actual inflation have 
been generated mainly by the consumption items whose price changes 
are perceived more sensitively as those items are frequently bought or 
have a larger share in household expenditures. Conducting a cross-
country comparison, we find that information rigidity in expectation 
formation process and the nexus between perceptions and expectations 
of inflation prove to be stronger in Korea. Additionally, we reconfirm 
the existing finding that the scope of information utilized for forming 
inflation expectations is fairly circumscribed. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
nflation expectations are deemed to affect actual inflation through pricing and 
wage negotiation of economic agents. Accordingly, if inflation expectations 
become unstable, actual inflation will become volatile, making it difficult for 
central banks to achieve price stability target and possibly lowering the credibility 
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of monetary policy. As such, inflation expectations can directly affect the effectiveness
of monetary policy. Hence, it is one of the foremost tasks of central banks to 
discover the causes of changes in inflation expectations and strive persistently to 
explore alternative measures to stabilize them. One of the prerequisites for 
fulfilling that task successfully is to secure a firm understanding of how households 
form their inflation expectations. 
In modern macroeconomic theory, it is assumed that economic agents are 
forward-looking and form expectations in a rational manner, i.e., utilizing all 
available information at the time of expectation formation. However, considering 
the findings from existing foreign studies which attempted to uncover how 
inflation expectations are formed through various methods, such as empirical 
analyses, surveys and experiments, households are more likely to form inflation 
expectations in a backward-looking manner using fairly limited, not full, 
information (Blanchflower and MacCoille, 2009; Rowe, 2016; Bank of Japan, 
2016). In a similar vein, research on inflation expectations in Korea commonly 
shows that households’ inflation expectations (1) are formed while depending 
heavily on past inflation information; (2) move in tandem with, and do not precede, 
actual inflation; and (3) show systematic forecast errors in relation to actual 
inflation. In particular, Lee (2012) finds through a correlation analysis that inflation 
expectations comove with inflation at the time of expectation formation rather than 
future inflation over the sample period from January 2000 to October 2011. 
Likewise, a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis in that paper reveals that 
inflation expectations turn out to be affected mainly by historical inflation. Choi 
(2012) estimates the proportion of the households whose expectations are formed 
in an adaptive manner to be around 60% using a sample spanning from February 
2002 to June 2012. As a result, the persistence of inflation expectations in Korea 
proves to be stronger compared to that in the US, the UK, Sweden and New 
Zealand. Lee (2012) and Choi (2012) commonly confirm the existence of 
systematic bias in inflation expectations with regard to actual inflation. 
Indisputably, those studies have greatly advanced our understanding of inflation 
expectation formation which had been recognized as a black box. However, the 
possibility that subjective inflation perceptions may play an important role in 
forming inflation expectations and they can account for the observed strong nexus 
between actual inflation and inflation expectations has been overlooked. To the 
best of our knowledge, there exists no academic attempt to verify these hypotheses 
in Korea. Even in overseas research, efforts to explore a link connecting inflation, 
its perceptions and expectations altogether appears to be scarce, although studies 
which examine inflation perceptions are abundant. 
There is an additional limitation in the existing research on inflation expectations 
in Korea in that those studies used mainly pre-2013 data on inflation expectations 
which were compiled while providing survey respondents with an average 
inflation rate over the last 12 months. Therefore, the survey question per se may 
have induced households to form expectations in a backward-looking manner.1 
 
1Choi (2012) raised the possibility that the provision of inflation information on the Consumer Survey 
questionnaires caused inflation expectations to be nearly equal to actual inflation. To resolve this issue, the Bank 
of Korea which conducts the Consumer Survey decided not to provide historical inflation on the questionnaire 
starting in 2013. This new survey method changed fundamentally the property of data on inflation expectations. 
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Motivated by these considerations, we analyze the relationships between actual 
inflation, inflation perceptions and expectations using the data from the Consumer 
Survey. Our analysis consists of three parts. In the first part, we attempt to validate 
the high level of correlation between actual inflation and inflation expectations 
documented in earlier work using post-2013 data which were compiled without 
providing survey respondents with inflation information. To take an additional step 
from a correlation analysis, we attempt to verify whether there exists a causality 
running from actual inflation to inflation expectations and examine the relationship 
between perceptions and expectations of inflation. From the results of these 
analyses, we derive a hypothetical reason why actual inflation, inflation 
perceptions and expectations are closely associated and then substantiate it by 
probing into item-level data in the CPI (Consumer Price Index) and microdata from 
the Consumer Survey. 
In the second part of the analysis, we conduct a cross-country comparison to 
assess to what extent our findings on expectation formation in Korea can be 
generalized. We analyze data from the four advanced economies of the U.S, the 
Euro area, the UK and Japan, and survey a wide range of related empirical studies 
from overseas. In the last part, we estimate the scope of information households 
utilize when forming inflation expectations in Korea and then present the findings 
documented in overseas studies. 
The following novel findings in this paper are expected to contribute to the 
literature along these three lines. First, inflation expectations are affected more 
strongly by inflation perceptions than by actual inflation. Secondly, the apparently 
strong correlation between inflation expectations and actual inflation stems from 
the fact that inflation perceptions closely follow the trend of actual inflation. In 
turn, the reason for why households perceive the past trend of inflation somewhat 
accurately is that changes in actual inflation have been generated mainly by the 
consumption items whose price changes are perceived more sensitively by 
households as they are frequently bought or take a larger share of household 
expenditures. Lastly, a cross-country comparison, rarely conducted in the literature, 
reveals that the inflation expectations of households are formed in a backward-
looking manner in general and that the nexus between inflation perceptions and 
expectations in Korea is stronger compared to that in advanced economies.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents evidence of the nexus 
between actual inflation, inflation perceptions and expectations. Section III 
provides commonalities and differences in how households in Korea and in the 
aforementioned advanced economies form inflation expectations. Section IV 
presents the result of an analysis regarding the scope of information used when 
forming expectations and presents the findings of relevant overseas studies. Section 
V concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
 
II. Nexus between Inflation Perceptions and Expectations 
 
In this section, we make an attempt to reveal a hidden nexus between inflation, 
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inflation perceptions and expectations.2 We start by defining the key terms which 
are used in this paper. Henceforth, inflation refers to the CPI inflation rate 
announced by Statistics Korea. It is also expressed as actual inflation to make it 
clearly distinct from inflation perceptions and expectations. Inflation expectations 
refer to households’ forecast for one-year ahead inflation and inflation perceptions 
mean the perceived level of inflation over the last year the data for which are 
compiled by the Consumer Survey of the Bank of Korea. Past inflation and future 
inflation mean the average CPI inflation rate for one year before and after a certain 
time point, respectively. 
 
A. Nexus between Actual Inflation and Inflation Expectations 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the previous studies on inflation expectations 
in Korea share a common finding irrespective of differences in the methods and 
time periods of analysis used: inflation expectations are formed in a backward-
looking manner.3 In order to check whether this commonality is still valid using 
post-2013 data, the coefficients of cross-correlation are estimated between inflation 
expectations and actual inflation at three different time horizons, i.e., over the past 
one year, at the time of expectation formation and over the next year. The sample 
period starts from January 2013, when the new method of questioning households 
about their forecasts for inflation was introduced, and ends with October 2017. In 
Figure 1, the panels on the left show the trend of actual inflation and its 
expectations. Those on the right in the same figure present the coefficients of the 
cross-correlation between the two indicators. 
 
[Inflation for the next one year] 
      
 
2A variety of methods are used to measure inflation expectations, which are non-observable in nature. There 
are two typical measures: survey-based and market-based indicators. Survey-based indicators are compiled by 
aggregating the collected forecasts for future inflation data from a group of economic agents, such as households, 
corporations and experts. Market-based indicators include the break-even inflation rate (BEI) referring to the gap 
between the yields of inflation-linked government bonds and plain government bonds, and inflation-linked interest 
rates applied to transactions of inflation swaps, a derivative for transferring inflation risk. 
3Lee (2012) estimated the correlation between actual inflation and inflation expectations for the period from 
February 2002 to October 2011. Lee and Choi (2015) and Choi (2012) used a regression analysis to estimate the 
relationship between those two indicators for the period from February 2002 to December 2012 and from February 
2002 to June 2012, respectively. All of these studies show that inflation expectations are formed in a backward-
looking manner. However, as noted earlier, the analysis periods in these studies end before 2013, with survey 
respondents given the information about the past CPI inflation rates. 
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[Inflation at the time of expectation formation] 
    
 
 
[Inflation over the past one year] 
    
FIGURE 1. CROSS-CORRELATION BETWEEN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND ACTUAL INFLATION 
Source: Bank of Korea; Statistics Korea; Authors’ calculations. 
 
To take one step beyond the correlation analysis above, we test whether past 
inflation has any causal effect on inflation expectations. The following regression 
model in Ehrmann (2015) is estimated for the same sample period used in the 
correlation analysis above.4  
 
(1)     1 2 3
e aver aver
t t n t t t n tD D              
 
where et  refers to inflation expectations at time t  and avert n   is the average of 
past inflation from time t n to t . The dummy variable tD  denotes the period in 
which past inflation continued to rise. It is included to examine whether the 
influence of past inflation on inflation expectations varies depending on the phases 
of the inflation trend. The dividing time point between the inflation-rising and 
inflation-declining phases is set as September 2016 based on the results of a 
 
4In Ehrmann (2015), the entire sample period is divided into two categories depending on whether or not the 
inflation of the preceding month exceeds the inflation target. Assigning dummies to one type of period, Ehrmann 
(2015) examines whether the dependence of inflation expectations on actual inflation varies depending on the 
periods. Unlike Ehrmann (2015), we divide the sample period into only two parts depending on whether or not 
inflation continues to rise. 
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structural break test.5 Specifically, the inflation-declining phase lasts from January 
2013 to August 2016 and naturally the other part of the sample period, from 
September 2016 to October 2017, is defined as the inflation-rising period. 
Therefore, the regression coefficient 1  represents the dependency of inflation 
expectations on past inflation in the inflation-declining phase and 1 3   denotes 
that for the inflation-rising phase. 
As shown in Table 1 below, 1  is estimated to belong to the interval of [0.49, 
0.61], which implies that inflation expectations in the inflation-declining phase 
react sensitively to actual inflation. In more detail, it is estimated that the average 
inflation over the past three to twelve months has a greater impact on inflation 
expectations than current inflation. From this result, it can be inferred that 
households regard the longer-term trend of past inflation as more important than 
the most recent inflation when forming expectations.6 On the other hand, in the 
inflation-rising phase, inflation expectations are estimated to still be less dependent 
on actual inflation than in the inflation-declining phase given that the estimates of 
( 1 3  ) are in the interval of [0.03, 0.10], i.e., close to zero.  
However, these estimation results cannot be viewed as a weakening in the 
backward-looking nature of inflation expectations in the inflation-rising era. 
Considering that actual inflation has continued to rise since the second half of 2016 
while inflation expectations remain nearly flat within the narrow range of 2.5%-
2.6% as indicated in the bottom left panel of Figure 1, it is more convincing to 
regard the results as an indication that households became less attentive to recent 
inflation information over the same period. This can be considered a puzzle in that 
the participants in overseas experimental studies show a tendency to be more 
sensitive to hikes than reductions in prices. One possible explanation is that 
households in Korea might not actively update inflation information expecting 
inflation to remain low as it had been at a historically low level for a prolonged 
period. However, this hypothetical proposition must be corroborated through an 
additional analysis after a longer time series of inflation expectations is secured. 
  
TABLE 1—ESTIMATED RESULTS: LINK BETWEEN ACTUAL AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
 ߙ ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚଵ + ߚଷ ܴଶ F statistics 
n=0 (current) 2.21*** 0.49*** 0.19 -0.39*** 0.10 0.62 29.30*** 
n=2 (3-month average) 2.11*** 0.57*** 0.38*** -0.52*** 0.05 0.69 40.87*** 
n=5 (6-month average) 2.05*** 0.61*** 0.46*** -0.56*** 0.05 0.74 52.42*** 
n=11 (12-month average) 2.02*** 0.59*** 0.52*** -0.56*** 0.03 0.80 72.99*** 
Note: 1) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 2) The Newey-West HAC estimator is used for 
generating the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals.  
 
5The structural break point is estimated by an autoregression model using CPI to conform to the purpose of 
the regression analysis above. 
6The result showing that inflation expectations are significantly affected by past inflation suggests that the 
inflation target scarcely influences inflation expectations. This hypothesis, however, must be verified by 
estimating a regression equation with different explanatory variables. According to a recent study, in New Zealand 
which introduced inflation targeting for the first time, 88% of all respondents to a business executive survey 
reported that their own purchasing experiences are most important when forming inflation expectations (Kumar et 
al., 2015). 
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B. Nexus between Inflation Perceptions and Expectations 
 
Numerous foreign studies have shown that the inflation expectations of 
households are influenced not only by objective information on, e.g., inflation, 
business and economic policy but also by subjective inflation perceptions.7 In 
Figure 2, the perceptions and expectations of inflation in Korea appear to be nearly 
identical during the sample period from January 2013 to October 2017 in Korea. 
The average gap between these two indicators is merely 0.05%p. Naturally, the 
correlation coefficient between the expectations and perceptions of inflation is 
0.97, i.e., close to one. On the other hand, the coefficient of the correlation between 
actual inflation and inflation expectations is 0.68, far from one, and the average gap 
between these two amounts to 1.47%p. Most remarkable is that the correlation 
coefficient between inflation perceptions and actual inflation is estimated to be as 
high as 0.72. This suggests that households perceive the trend, but not the level, of 
inflation relatively accurately. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. INFLATION, INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS 
Source: Bank of Korea; Statistics Korea. 
  
TABLE 2—CORRELATION AND GAP BETWEEN INFLATION, INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS 
 Correlation Mean Absolute Deviation (%p) 
Perceptions and Expectations 0.97 0.05 
Perceptions and Actual Inflation 0.72 1.45 
Expectations and Actual Inflation 0.68 1.47 
Note: 1) The sample period is from January 2013 to October 2017. 2) Inflation is the average CPI inflation rate 
over the past one year.  
 
7According to the Household Survey conducted by the Bank of England in February 2008, about half of the 
respondents noted that their own inflation perceptions are the most important determinant of inflation expectations 
(Benford and Driver, 2008). 
Parenthetically, the notion that inflation perceptions are important in forming inflation expectations appears 
to have attracted attention even in the 1980s. (“The perceived rate of inflation, that is, the public’s knowledge 
about the historical behavior of the price level, plays an extremely important—although little observed—role in 
much of recent work on the formation of inflationary expectations,” Jonung (1981)). However, research on the 
determinants of inflation perceptions became active only after the 2000s. 
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To test whether a causality runs from inflation perceptions to inflation 
expectations, the following model is estimated for the period from January 2013 to 
October 2017. Considering the cointegrated relationship between the perceptions 
and expectations of inflation and the minute differences between those two 
variables, the model is expressed in an error correction form.8 
 
(2)   1
e p
t t t tGAP            
 
where et  and pt  refer to inflation expectations and inflation perceptions, 
respectively. 1tGAP  denotes the estimate of the long-run equilibrium error between 
the perceptions and expectations of inflation.9 According to the estimation results, 
the coefficient   representing the impact of inflation perceptions on inflation 
expectations turns out to be significant at the 1% level.  
Next, to compare the effects of inflation perceptions with those of actual 
inflation on inflation expectations, we re-estimate   after substituting the average 
inflation over 12 months 12
aver
t   for the inflation perceptions pt  in the equation 
(1) above. The result presented on the right-hand side of Table 3 shows that actual 
inflation is estimated to be insignificant. 
Microdata from the Consumer Survey also lend firm support to the hypothesis 
that inflation perceptions are an overriding determinant of inflation expectations. In 
the individual responses of the survey, 68% of the respondents on average expected 
one-year-ahead inflation to be equal to the currently perceived level of inflation 
during the same period as in the analysis above.10 Although this proportion varies 
slightly depending on the interval of expected inflation, it is approximately 70% in 
all intervals as shown in Figure 3.11 
Notable is that for the respondents whose forecasts are in the range of 0% to 3%, 
which is close to the range of actual inflation, 0.4% to 2.6% during the sample 
period, the tendency to expect future inflation to be equal to inflation perceptions is 
found to be stronger. If these respondents had had relatively more opportunities to 
ascertain that their inflation perceptions were close to actual inflation by updating 
inflation information, this would have enhanced their trust in their own perceptions 
and hence strengthened their backward-looking inclination.12  
 
8Equation (2) represents the short-term dynamics of the relationship between inflation perceptions and 
expectations and the GAP term refers to short-term deviations from the long-run equilibrium. We ascertain that 
there exists at least one cointegrating vector between inflation perceptions and expectations through a Johansen 
cointegration test, which implies the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between those two variables. 
9That long-run equilibrium error indicates the estimate of the error term ξ୲ in the following long-term 
equilibrium equation. 
ߨ௧௘ = ݈ + ߜߨ௧௉ + ߦ௧  
10By age group, the average percentage of respondents with inflation perceptions are equal to inflation 
expectations is 64.3% in their 20s, 68.9% in 30s, 70.4% in 40s, 67.4% in 50s, and 65.6% in 60s or older. The 
percentages for respondents in their 30s and 40s are higher. By gender for this measure, males are at 68.2%, higher 
than females, for whom this rate is 64.6%. 
11In the Consumer Survey, the question on inflation expectations is designed such that respondents select one 
of 1%p-wide intervals in the range of 0% to 6%. For more detailed information about this, the reader can refer to 
Appendix A. Consumer Survey Questions about Inflation Perceptions and Expectations. 
12From the perspective of Bayesian learning, if one assigns a high weight to prior belief about actual inflation 
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TABLE 3—IMPACT OF PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL INFLATION ON INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
Inflation Perceptions (ߨ௧௉) Inflation over the past year (ߨ௧ିଵଶ௔௩௘௥) 
0.79*** 0.18 
ܴଶ = 0.57, ܦܹ = 2.09 ܴଶ = 0.12, ܦܹ = 2.23 
Note: 1) The impact refers to the regression coefficient   of the equation (2). 2) *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. PROPORTION OF RESPONSES EXPECTING FUTURE INFLATION TO BE EQUAL TO 
INFLATION PERCEPTIONS 
Note: The proportion is the average proportion from January 2013 to October 2017. 
Source: Bank of Korea; Statistics Korea. 
  
C. Synthesis: Nexus between Actual Inflation, 
Inflation perceptions and Expectations 
 
Based on the analysis results presented above, we can reaffirm the common view 
that the inflation expectations of households in Korea are formed in a backward-
looking manner. Moreover, two novel findings derive from the results which are 
overlooked in existing domestic studies. First, inflation expectations are more 
strongly influenced by subjective inflation perceptions than by actual inflation. 
Second, the reason for the close correlation observed between actual inflation and 
inflation expectations is that inflation perceptions, exerting a decisive impact on 
inflation expectations, are approximately in line with movements in the trend of 
actual inflation. This second finding implies that households in Korea have 
recognized inflation trends correctly to a large extent. Then, a question arise here 
how common households can perceive the inflation trend with such exactness. 
As a possible rejoinder, we propose that changes in actual inflation have been 
led mainly by consumption items whose price changes are remembered more 
clearly as they have larger proportions in household expenditures and hold high 
purchasing frequencies. This hypothesis can be corroborated if the following two 
propositions prove to be true in order: first, inflation perceptions have been more 
                                                                                                         
in the process of forming expectations, information friction such as forecast error occurs, as hesitation can arise 
whether to accept new inflation information (Cavallo et al., 2017). 
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closely correlated with the price inflation of those items than that of other items, 
and second, the price inflation of those items of interest has contributed 
considerably to changes in actual inflation.  
Regarding the first proposition, as shown in Figure 4, the correlation coefficients 
are higher between inflation perceptions and the price changes in the following five 
item groups, rent, textiles, household utilities, fuel and processed food, which are 
frequently bought and which command large proportions of household 
expenditures.13 This is true also for the composite price index for those items. As 
indicated in Figure 5, the correlation coefficient is 0.76 between inflation perceptions  
 
 
FIGURE 4. CORRELATION BETWEEN INFLATION PERCEPTIONS AND PRICE INFLATION BY ITEM GROUP 
Note: 1) The sample period is from January 2013 to October 2017. 2) Price inflation is the average over the past 
one year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
 
FIGURE 5. INFLATION PERCEPTIONS AND THE GROWTH RATES OF THE COMPOSITE PRICE INDICES ITEM GROUPS 
Note: 1) The five item groups are rent, textile, household utilities, fuel and processed food. 2) Inflation perceptions 
and the growth rates of the composite indices are the six-month moving average. 
Source: Bank of Korea; Authors’ calculations.  
 
13According to the data of the Household Survey conducted by Statistics Korea from 2013 to 2016, the 
average expenditure shares on rent, textiles, household utilities, fuel and processed food out of total expenditures 
are 6.7%, 2.8%, 3.6%, 9.0%, and 10.2%, respectively, substantially higher than those of other item groups. 
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FIGURE 6. CONTRIBUTION BY ITEM GROUP TO INFLATION FLUCTUATIONS 
Note: 1) The five item groups are rent, textile, household utilities, fuel and processed food. 2) Inflation is the 
average over the past one year and does not include the effect of an increase in the tobacco tax in January 2016. 3) 
Changes in inflation are month-to-month changes of inflation itself. 
Source: Statistics Korea; Authors’ calculations. 
  
and the growth rate of the composite price index of those five item groups, whereas 
the same indicator for the other item groups is negatively correlated with inflation 
perceptions. 
At this stage, it is necessary to provide evidence of the second proposition to 
substantiate the hypothesis presented above. In Figure 6, the five item groups 
whose price inflation levels are highly correlated with inflation perceptions account 
for a considerable share of the changes in overall inflation. 
Synthesizing all of the pieces of evidence presented above, it can be concluded 
that households could track the trend of actual inflation accurately, as the item 
groups strongly affecting inflation perceptions contributed substantially to overall 
inflation fluctuations.14 This synthesis reveals that inflation perceptions act as a 
hidden hinge linking inflation expectations and actual inflation. 
 
III. Cross-country Comparison with Advanced Economies 
 
In this section, we conduct a cross-country comparison to assess to what extent 
our findings regarding expectation formation in Korea can be generalized. By 
analyzing the data from the four advanced economies, i.e., the US, the Euro area, 
the UK, and Japan and surveying overseas research findings, we derive certain 
commonalities and peculiarities of each individual economy in terms of 
expectation formation.15  
 
14The contribution to overall inflation fluctuations of the item group of agricultural products, livestock, 
marine products is not minor, but its correlation with inflation perceptions is quite tenuous. This outcome is 
mysterious considering that price changes in this item group should be discerned more clearly, as households 
purchase these products frequently as part of their daily lives. To infer, this stems from the fact that consumers are 
aware that prices of this item group are highly volatile due to irregular factors such as weather and seasonal factors 
and that they return to their long-term trend quickly. Hence, it is likely that households dismiss the price changes 
of such products when perceiving inflation. 
15Statistical agencies in the Euro area including Eurostat have been amassing internally the unpublished 
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A. Effects of Past Inflation on Expectations 
 
Numerous studies from advanced countries have also shown that inflation 
expectations are formed in a backward-looking manner. Blanchflower and 
MacCoille (2009), Rowe (2016) and Bank of Japan (2016) present survey results 
which reveal that personal purchasing experiences in the past exert a significant 
effect on expectation formation. Specifically, in Rowe (2016), the respondents 
report that recently perceived price changes in retail stores over the past twelve 
months as the most important determinant of their inflation expectations as shown 
in Figure 7. That survey result is surprisingly in good agreement with the data 
analysis outcome presented in the previous section showing that inflation 
perceptions in Korea play the foremost role in the process of froming inflation 
expectations. In addition, Ehrmann (2015) presents an empirical finding which 
shows that inflation expectations are formed in a backward-looking manner by 
estimating the extent to which inflation expectations react to actual inflation in 15 
advanced countries.16 
With the same method used in Section , we examine the correlation between Ⅱ
inflation expectations and actual inflation at three different time horizons. 
Considering Table 4, it is notable that the correlation coefficients of current and 
future inflation in all four advanced economies are higher than those for Korea. 
This suggests that households in those economies are more active in updating 
inflation information. When comparing the coefficients by time horizon in the 
individual economies, the correlation coefficients of past inflation in the Euro area 
and Japan are higher than those of current and future inflation. In the US and the 
UK, the correlation coefficient of current inflation is highest, but is nearly identical 
to that of past inflation. 
  
 
FIGURE 7. IMPORTANT FACTORS REPORTED AS DETERMINING INFLATION EXPECTATIONS IN THE UK 
Source: Rowe (2016).  
                                                                                                         
results of consumer surveys on inflation perceptions and expectations conducted at the level of individual EU 
member states since 2004. We obtained the data from January 2004 to July 2015 from Roberta Friz, one of the 
authors of Arioli et al. (2016) who compiled the data of inflation perceptions and expectations at the Euro area 
level based on the unpublished national survey results. 
16Easaw et al. (2013) presents similar survey results for Italy. 
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TABLE 4—CORRELATION BETWEEN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND ACTUAL INFLATION 
AT THREE DIFFERENT TIME HORIZONS 
 US Euro area UK Japan Korea 
Past Inflation 0.46 0.93 0.89 0.64 0.68 
Current Inflation 0.52 0.82 0.90 0.53 0.31 
Future Inflation 0.42 0.54 0.76 0.57 0.09 
Note: 1) Past and future inflation refer to the average CPI inflation rate over the 12 months before and after the 
time of expectation formation, respectively. Current inflation means the CPI inflation rate at the time of 
expectation formation. 2) The sample period is from January 2010 to September 2017 for the US, from January 
2010 to July 2015 for the Euro area, from Q1 2010 to Q3 2017 for the UK and Japan, and from January 2013 to 
October 2017 for Korea. 3) The data used for the Euro area come from Arioli et al. (2016). 
  
B. Effects of Past Inflation Perceptions on Expectations 
 
The tables on the right in Figure 8 below present the correlation coefficients 
between actual inflation, inflation perceptions and expectations during the period 
from 2010 to 2017 in the Euro area, the UK and Japan.17  The correlation 
coefficients between perceptions and expectations are 0.97 and 0.93 for the Euro 
area and the UK, respectively, similar to that of Korea. In Japan, it is relatively low 
compared to the other economies at 0.72 but is still high considering an absolute 
standard. On the other hand, in the US, where no data on inflation perceptions are 
available, recent surveys found that most respondents expected the future inflation 
rate to be close to the recent level of actual inflation (Detmeister et al., 2016).18 
Considering all of the results from this cross-country analysis, it can be concluded 
that households’ subjective perceptions in general play the most vital role in the 
formation of inflation expectations. 
 
[Euro area] 
   
 Correlation Mean absolute deviation (%p) 
Perceptions & 
Expectations 0.97 2.38 
Perceptions & 
Actual Infl. 0.94 5.19 
Expectations &
Actual Infl. 0.93 2.82 
   
  
 
17The sample periods for the UK and Japan are identical, from Q1 2010 to Q3 2009, and that for the Euro area 
is from January 2010 to July 2015. The UK and Japan compile data on inflation perceptions and expectations on a 
quarterly basis. The data for the Euro area come from Arioli et al. (2016). 
18The Federal Reserve asked the survey agency to add a new question about inflation perceptions to the 
existing questionnaire of the University of Michigan survey and to conduct surveys four times in 2016 using the 
augmented questionnaire. The results presented above are based on the two surveys conducted in February and 
May of 2016. 
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[UK] 
   
 Correlation Mean absolute deviation (%p) 
Perceptions & 
Expectation 0.93 0.49 
Perceptions & 
Actual Infl. 0.95 1.23 
Expectations &
Actual Infl. 0.89 0.94 
   
 
[Japan] 
   
 Correlation Mean absolute deviation (%p) 
Perceptions & 
Expectation 0.72 0.91 
Perceptions & 
Actual Infl. 0.77 3.50 
Expectations &
Actual Infl. 0.64 3.73 
   
 
[Korea] 
   
 Correlation Mean absolute deviation (%p) 
Perceptions & 
Expectation 0.97 0.05 
Perceptions & 
Actual Infl. 0.72 1.45 
Expectations &
Actual Infl. 0.68 1.47 
   
FIGURE 8. CORRELATION AND GAP BETWEEN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS, PERCEPTIONS, 
AND ACTUAL INFLATION 
Note: 1) The data used for the Euro area come from Arioli et al. (2016). 2) To ensure the statistical significance of 
the correlation coefficients, the sample period for the UK and Japan is extended to 2010 because these two 
countries compile data on inflation expectations and perceptions on a quarterly basis. 3) Actual inflation means the 
average inflation over the past one year. 
Source: National statistical office and the central bank of each country; Arioli et al. (2016). 
 
However, gaps between inflation perceptions and expectations in the advanced 
economies are larger than in Korea and vary with time appreciably, as indicated in 
Figure 9. It is deducible from the difference that in Korea, stronger is households’ 
inclination to forecast future inflation to be close to the currently perceived level of 
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inflation. In other words, backward-looking behaviors of households are more 
pronounced in Korea. It suggests that households in Korea may update inflation 
information less frequently; i.e., information rigidity in Korea is higher.19 
As there are noticeable gaps between the perceptions and expectations of 
inflation in the advanced economies, the impact of perceptions on expectations in 
those economies should be weaker than in Korea. This inference can be verified 
using equation (2). The results are presented in Table 5 below. Specifically, in the  
  
[Korea] [Euro area]
 
[UK] [Japan]
 
FIGURE 9. CROSS-CORRELATION BETWEEN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND ACTUAL INFLATION 
Source: National statistical office and the central bank of each country; Arioli et al. (2016). 
 
TABLE 5—ESTIMATED IMPACT ON INFLATION EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
 Inflation perceptions (ߨ௧௉) Inflation over the past year (ߨ௧ିଵଶ௔௩௘௥) 
Euro area 0.62***  1.05** 
UK 0.88***   0.34*** 
Japan 0.54*** 0.22 
Korea 0.79*** 0.18 
Note: 1) Estimated impact refers to the coefficient ߚ in equation (2): ∆ߨ௧௘ = ߙ + ߚ∆ߨ௧௉ + ߛܩܣ ௧ܲିଵ + ߳௧. 2) The 
sample period is from January 2010 to July 2015 for the Euro area, from Q1 2010 to Q3 2017 for the UK and 
Japan, and from January 2013 to October 2017 for Korea. 3) *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% 
and 5% level, respectively.  
 
19Because it is beyond the purpose of this paper to elucidate the reason why information rigidity appears to be 
stronger in Korea, we leave this issue for future studies. 
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Euro area, inflation over the past one year influences expectations more heavily 
than inflation perceptions, while in Japan, the impacts of the two indicators are 
estimated to be similar. 
 
C. An Additional Commonality 
 
The results of the cross-country analysis above can be considered as provisional 
evidence that inflation expectations of households are formed universally in a 
backward-looking manner. We find an additional commonality in the relationship 
between actual inflation and inflation expectations. As presented in Figure 10, 
inflation perceptions always outstrip actual inflation in all of the economies, 
thereby causing systematic forecast errors in inflation expectations.20 We ascribe 
this phenomenon to households’ cognitive biases operating when perceiving 
inflation. Experimental studies have shown that general consumers are more 
susceptible to price increases, especially larger increases, than decreases and hence 
remember them more clearly. Jungermann et al. (2007) find that the participants in 
an experiment tend to perceive price increases more accurately compared to price  
 
[Korea] [Euro area]
 
[UK] [Japan]
 
FIGURE 10. INFLATION PERCEPTIONS AND ACTUAL INFLATION 
Source: National statistical office and the central bank of each country; Arioli et al. (2016).
 
20The estimation results presented in Appendix B verify systematic forecast errors in inflation expectations in 
Korea and in the advanced economies.  
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decreases.21 Bruine de Bruin et al. (2011) also present an experimental result 
showing that larger price changes are more strongly remembered. 22  As a 
consequence, this asymmetric perception of price changes acts as a factor that 
widens the gap between inflation expectations and actual inflation in an inflation-
declining era. Arithmetically, inflation declines if consumption items whose prices 
decrease or increase by less than before multiplies. In such a situation, economic 
agents become less sensitive to price changes, consequently, the gap between 
inflation perceptions and actual inflation would become larger. 
Additionally, the tendency of selecting the central intervals on the Consumer 
Survey question with regard to inflation perceptions may act as a marginal factor 
causing inflation perceptions to remain higher than actual inflation when the latter 
is below 2%. On the survey questionnaires for Korea and the UK, respondents are 
asked to choose one among 1%p-wide intervals from 0% to 6%. With this type of 
questionnaire design, respondents are more likely to choose intervals in the range 
of 2% to 4%, leading inflation perceptions to exceed actual inflation. 
 
IV. Scope of Information for Forming Inflation Expectations 
 
A. Case of Korea 
 
The rational expectation theory assumes that economic agents utilize all 
information available at the time they form expectations for the future.23 Applying 
this to inflation expectation formation, economic agents should employ not only 
price information but also information on macroeconomic variables and economic 
policies. However, contrary to this hypothesis, previous studies have verified that 
economic agents mainly use their personal memories of specific price changes and 
a narrow range of economic information.24 Below, we estimate the scope of 
information presumably utilized when forming inflation expectations in Korea à la 
Forsells and Kenny (2002) for the period from January 2013 to October 2017.25 
The estimation model is specified as follows. 
 
 
21Research in behavioral economics suggests the loss aversion tendency maintained by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) as the reason for economic agents reacting more sensitively to increases in prices than decreases 
(Brachinger, 2008; Jungermann et al., 2007). 
22These findings apparently contradict the estimation result of equation (1) presented in the previous section, 
showing that inflation expectations react more sensitively to actual inflation in the inflation-declining period. To 
reiterate our hypothetical explanation proposed in the same section regarding that puzzle, households might expect 
low inflation to persist longer into the future without active updating of inflation information as inflation remained 
subdued for too long a period. 
23Hall (1978) maintains that inflation expectations can be said to be formed rationally only when economic 
agents understand the structure of the economy accurately and hold all information necessary for generating 
optimal forecasts in a statistical sense. 
24This is supported by results of analyses using various methodologies such as surveys (Benford and Driver, 
2008; Rowe, 2016) and experiments (Georganas et al., 2014, inter alia). Unlike these findings, Forsells and Kenny 
(2002) show that the level of rationality is estimated to be intermediate in the expectation formation process in the 
Euro area. 
25Lee (2012), using data from February 2002 to October 2010 and the methodology of Forsells and Kenny 
(2002), indicated earlier that inflation expectations are not formed in a rational manner. However, the data, as 
noted earlier, were compiled by asking inflation forecasts while providing past CPI inflation rates.   
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(3)      et t t t          
 
where t  is the average inflation over the coming twelve months after time t  
and et  denotes inflation expectations formed at time t . The dependent variable, 
e
tt  , is the forecast error. t  is the information set employed by economic 
agents at the time of expectation formation, which includes the indicators of price, 
business and financial condition. Specifically, price indicators are the CPI inflation 
rate and the growth rates of nominal wages and house prices. Business indicators 
include the cyclical components of the composite leading index and composite 
coincident index, and the growth rate of industrial production. Financial indicators 
are the yields of 91-day CDs (Certificates of Deposit) and three-year government 
bonds, and exchange rates. Following Forsells and Kenny (2002), we conduct 
univariate regressions including each indicator as a unique explanatory variable to 
prevent multi-collinearity problem. 
If the regression coefficient   is statistically significant, it implies that the 
information content of a specific indicator remains in the forecast error. In other 
words, the indicator is not sufficiently taken into account in the process of forming 
inflation expectations. To interpret the estimation results presented in Table 6, all 
the price indicators are utilized when forming inflation expectations while most of 
the business indicators and financial indicators are not. Based on this result, it can 
be concluded that inflation expectations in Korea are formed using fairly limited 
information, such as inflation, wages, and housing prices, not with all available 
information.26 
 
TABLE 6—ESTIMATION RESULT OF THE INFLATION EXPECTATION RATIONALITY TEST 
 Ω௧ λ p-value 
Price Indicators 
CPI inflation rate -0.114 0.623 
Nominal wage growth rate 0.045 0.173 
House prices growth rate 0.037 0.228 
Business Indicators 
Composite leading index -0.112 0.637 
Coincident composite index 0.622 0.029** 
Industrial production growth rate 0.102 0.014** 
Financial Indicators
91-day CD rate -0.459 0.009*** 
Three-year government bond yields -0.377 0.019** 
Exchange rate 0.003 0.009*** 
Note: 1) The Newey-West HAC estimator is used to generate the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. 2) 
Growth rate means year-on-year change. 4) Business indices specifically refers to its cyclical components, not the 
level. 4) *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
 
26Among the business indicators, the λ of composite leading index proves to be insignificant. However, 
considering the coefficients of the other two business indicators are significant, it is questionable that households 
allow for composite leading index in practice when forming inflation expectations.. 
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B. Case of Foreign Countries: A Survey of the Literature 
 
Research findings accumulated in advanced countries have also substantiated 
that only a limited range of information is considered when forming inflation 
expectations. This section summarizes the main findings from those studies, 
instead of performing the same econometric analysis applied to Korea in the 
previous subsection. Table 7 presents the studies and the associated analysis 
methodology.  
Among those studies, Georganas et al. (2014) show in a US-based experiment 
that price inflation for items with high purchasing frequency influences inflation 
perceptions strongly. Cavallo et al. (2017) present an experimental result showing 
that the prices of goods sold in supermarkets exert greater effects on inflation 
expectations than CPI inflation. Kamada et al. (2015) also ascertain that the impact 
of food and energy prices on inflation expectations is greater than CPI inflation in 
Japan. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) estimate that more than 50% of the gap 
between the expectations of experts and general consumers can be explained by 
fluctuations in crude oil prices in the US from 2009 to 2011. 
Additionally, Rowe (2016) found using a survey method that most households 
report that their inflation perceptions are determined mainly by the price inflation 
of the items with high purchase frequency such as food and drinks, household 
utilities, clothing and footwear, fuel and housing, among others, as indicated in 
Figure 11. Strikingly, this survey result is in fairly good agreement with the results 
of the data analysis presented in Section , which showed inflation perceptions in Ⅱ
Korea are closely correlated with the price inflation of the consumption items 
which account for a high proportion of household expenditures or which are 
frequently bought. 
 
TABLE 7—RESEARCH ON THE FORMATION OF INFLATION PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
IN ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
Country Research Research method 
US 
Cavallo et al. (2017) 
Georganas et al. (2014) 
Souleles (2004) 
Vlasenko and Cunningham (2015) 
 
Experiment 
Experiment 
Regression analysis 
Creating a new price index and regression 
analysis (Granger causality) 
Germany Jungermann et al. (2007) Experiment 
UK Rowe (2016) Household survey 
Switzerland Huber (2011) Experiment 
Sweden Jonung (1981) Household survey and regression analysis 
Australia Kumar et al. (2015) Company survey 
Japan Kamada et al. (2015) Regression analysis 
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FIGURE 11. MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS REPORTED AS DETERMINING INFLATION PERCEPTIONS IN UK 
Note: Respondents were allowed to choose up to four factors in the survey. 
Source: Rowe (2016). 
 
V. Summary and Policy Implications 
  
The inflation expectations of households in Korea are determined mainly by 
subjective inflation perceptions and historical inflation, that is, in a backward-
looking manner. In particular, considering the fact that inflation expectations are 
nearly identical to inflation perceptions while hovering above actual inflation, 
inflation perceptions are inferred to be more influential in expectation formation 
process than actual inflation. In the related research in Korea, the high level of co-
movement between inflation expectations and actual inflation has been proposed as 
an empirical basis for backward-looking expectation formation. According to our 
analysis, the observed close correlation between inflation expectations and actual 
inflation arises from the fact that inflation perceptions strongly affecting inflation 
expectations move in tandem with the actual inflation trend. In turn, the strong 
correlation between inflation perceptions and the inflation trend originates from the 
fact that households perceive inflation fluctuations mainly utilizing the price 
information of consumption items that contribute substantially to changes in actual 
inflation. 
Turning to the scope of information used for forming inflation expectations, 
inflation expectations are estimated to be formed with fairly bounded information 
rather than with all available information at the time of expectation formation. In 
particular, two categories of information are predominant: first, the price 
information of consumption items such as fuel, clothing, rent that are more 
frequently purchased and that have a larger share of household consumption 
expenditures, and second, price indicators such as CPI, wages and house prices. 
From the results of the cross-country analysis of this paper and existing research 
findings, we derive two commonalities in terms of expectation formation. First, 
inflation expectations are formed in a backward-looking manner in general with 
only limited information. Second, inflation perceptions and expectations continue 
to outstrip actual inflation mainly due to asymmetric price perceptions. On the 
other hand, there exist several differences between Korea and the advanced 
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economies compared in the analysis. While inflation perceptions and expectations 
are nearly equal in Korea, there is an appreciable time-varying gap between the two 
indicators in the advanced economies. Furthermore, the impact of inflation 
perceptions on expectations is estimated to be not as predominant as it is in Korea. 
One possible explanation for these differences is that the propensity of households 
in Korea to forecast the current level of inflation to persist into the future, i.e., the 
backward-looking nature of expectation formation, is more pronounced than in the 
advanced economies. 
Considering the analysis results of this paper overall, stabilizing actual inflation 
through monetary policy implementation appears to be the most effective means 
for anchoring inflation expectations. Put differently, the scope for central banks to 
affect inflation expectations with measures other than monetary policy is narrower. 
The reason is that inflation expectations are estimated to be determined mainly by 
the price changes of a few consumption items such as rent, clothing, petroleum and 
by past inflation trends. Overseas central banks which have emphasized the 
importance of anchoring inflation expectations fail to devise any additional 
stabilization measures. However, strengthening communication on the topic 
inflation stabilization and the monetary policy stance may help to enhance the 
stability of inflation expectations.27 In particular, if inflation expectations diverge 
excessively from actual inflation while showing a highly volatile path, it may be 
necessary for central banks to communicate its intention to stabilize inflation to the 
public aggressively by, for instance, publicizing its inflation target more frequently. 
Furthermore, conducting this study, we have realized that it is necessary to study 
to what extent inflation expectations affect actual inflation in practice using a 
variety of methods, such as surveys and quantitative analyses. The common 
knowledge that inflation expectations affect actual inflation through price setting 
and wage negotiations is based mainly on the theoretical Phillips Curve 
relationship, the cornerstone of the New Keynesian theory rather than on empirical 
evidence. Future studies on that issue will hopefully prompt discussions leading to 
re-examination of the importance of inflation expectations from the viewpoint of 
monetary policy. 
  
 
27Ehrmann et al. (2017) argue that communication from central banks regarding inflation stabilization can 
contribute to anchoring inflation expectations, as inflation expectations respond sensitively to news about 
inflation. In addition, Fritzer and Rumler (2015) suggest that forecast errors in inflation expectations of 
respondents who are aware of inflation targets are smaller than those of the other respondents. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Consumer Survey Questions for Inflation Perceptions and Expectations 
 
• By how much do you think CPI inflation  
has changed over the past year? 
 
a. decreased 
b. 0% to less than 1% 
c. 1% to less than 2% 
d. 2% to less than 3% 
e. 3% to less than 4% 
f. 4% to less than 5% 
g. 5% to less than 6% 
h. 6% or more 
i. don’t know 
• By how much do you expect the CPI to change  
over the coming year? 
 
a. decreased 
b. 0% to less than 1% 
c. 1% to less than 2% 
d. 2% to less than 3% 
e. 3% to less than 4% 
f. 4% to less than 5% 
g. 5% to less than 6% 
h. 6% or more 
i. don’t know 
 
 
B. Systematical Forecasting Error of Inflation Expectations 
 
The following regression model proposed by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) is 
estimated to examine whether the gap between inflation expectations and future 
inflation for the next year occurs regularly and continuously. 
 
12
aver
t
e
t t        
 
In this equation, 12
aver
t   denotes the annual average inflation for one year after 
time t , which is the time of expectation formation. et  denotes expectations for 
average inflation over the next year, i.e., inflation expectations in the Consumer 
Survey. The null hypothesis is ‘ 0   and 1  ’, which means that the bias of 
inflation expectations ( et ) is not systematic. As shown in Table A1, the null 
hypothesis is rejected in Korea and in the major advanced countries, which implies 
the forecasting error in inflation expectations occurs systematically. 
 
TABLE A1—FORECASTING ERROR OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
 Korea US Euro area UK Japan 
ߙ -1.53*** -1.00* -2.07*** -1.88** -2.03** 
ߚ 0.91*** 0.86*** 2.32*** 1.31*** 0.63*** 
ܨ statistics 40.16*** 20.62*** 25.35*** 26.36*** 10.96*** 
Note: 1) If the null hypothesis ‘ߙ = 0 and ߚ = 1’ is rejected, forecasting error in inflation expectations occurs 
systematically. 2) The sample periods are from January 2013 to August 2016 for Korea, from January 2010 to 
September 2017 for the US, and from Q1 2010 to Q3 2017 for the others economies. 3) ***, **, and * denote the 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  
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